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ABSTRACT
In this paper we argue that an important source of the recent increase in outsourcing is the computer
and information technology revolution, characterized by increased rates of technological change. Our
model shows that an increase in the pace of technological change increases outsourcing because it
allows firms to use services based on leading edge technologies without incurring the sunk costs of
adopting these new technologies. In addition, firms using more IT-intensive technologies face lower
outsourcing costs of IT-based services generating a positive correlation between the IT level of the
user and its outsourcing share of IT-based services. This implication is verified in the data.
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During the 1990s, there was a substantial increase in labor outsourcing among U.S.
manufacturing ﬁrms.1 Firms are increasingly purchasing the services of outside providers
to perform tasks that were previously performed by in-house employees or to perform
new tasks. The outside service providers are used to carry out administrative duties
or to provide business support such as security, engineering, maintenance, sales, legal
services, accounting services, food services, data processing, and software development.
Another manifestation of the trend towards outsourcing is the increased use of temporary
workers.2
“Make-or-buy” decisions are fundamental to the degree of vertical integration of
the ﬁrm and ultimately to the industrial organization of production. The transactions
costs literature emphasizes the role played by asset speciﬁcity in deﬁning the boundaries
of the ﬁrm (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Speciﬁc assets
create “quasi-rents” which tempt ﬁrms to behave opportunistically in order to appropri-
ate as much of these rents as possible. These costs of transacting through the market
can be mitigated through in-house production (and by the use of long-term contracts
and reputation). It is the balancing of these costs against its beneﬁts that deﬁnes the
boundaries of the ﬁrm.
While there is empirical evidence in support of diﬀerent explanations for the ex-
istence of labor outsourcing (e.g. Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Houseman, 2001), little
is known about why it has increased so dramatically in recent years. One exception is
Autor (2002) who presents evidence that 20% of the 1973-1995 growth in temporary
employment can be attributed to exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine in the
U.S., which has raised the costs of terminating workers.
In this paper we propose that an important source of the recent increase in out-
1According to the Census of Manufacturers, the ratio of purchased services to value added more than
doubled, rising from 4.25% in 1992 to 10.68% in 1997.
2Between 1979 and 1995, the Temporary Help Supply industry in the U.S. grew at 11 percent annually
—o v e rﬁve times more rapidly than U.S. non-farm employment. See Autor (2002) and Esteveo and Lach
(1999a).
1sourcing is the computer and information technology revolution, characterized by in-
creased rates of technological change. We present a model that examines the diﬀerent
channels by which technological change can aﬀect the ﬁrm’s decision to outsource. Ac-
cording to our model, a ﬁrm decides to outsource a service or to produce it in-house
depending on which organizational mode minimizes production costs. The cost of out-
sourcing is the price of the service plus an adjustment cost speciﬁct ot h eﬁrm. Since
there is a ﬁxed cost in the production of the service, the economies of scale generated by
this ﬁxed cost are exploited by setting up a ﬁrm that sells the service to several users.
The service provider can then oﬀer the service at a price below the average cost of in-
house production. At this lower price, some ﬁr m s( t h o s ew i t ha d j u s t m e n tc o s t sb e l o wa
threshold) will outsource.
Given this general framework, we show that the level of technology in the produc-
tion of the service cannot predict an increase in outsourcing without making additional
assumptions. An increase in the speed of technological change, however, will increase
outsourcing because it allows ﬁrms to use services based on leading edge technologies
without incurring the ever more frequent sunk costs of adopting these new technologies.
In addition, we argue that the generality and portability of the skills associated with the
wave of information technology (IT) innovations in recent years reduce the costs of out-
sourcing IT-based services and, therefore, lead to increases in the outsourcing of these
services. For the same reasons, ﬁrms using more IT-intensive technologies face lower
outsourcing costs of IT-based services generating a positive correlation between the IT
level of the user and its outsourcing share of IT-based services.
Section 2 reviews prior research that explores various explanations for labor out-
sourcing. Section 3 presents our basic model of outsourcing which is then expanded in
Section 4 to incorporate technological change in the production of services. In Section 5
the model considers the impact of investments in IT by ﬁnal good ﬁrms and industry-
level data is used to test the model’s predictions. Consistent with our model, we ﬁnd that
as ﬁnal good producers increase their reliance on IT, they are more likely to purchase
outside services. Section 6 concludes.
22 Prior Research on Labor Outsourcing
Prior research has proposed and tested several reasons for labor outsourcing. Abraham
and Taylor (1996) used a special addendum to thirteen manufacturing Industry Wage
Surveys conducted by the Bureau of Labor Statistics between June 1986 and September
1987 to test whether ﬁrms’ use of outside contractors was induced by (1) the desire to
cut costs by contracting out to ﬁrms that oﬀer less generous wage and beneﬁt packages,
(2) the demand for greater ﬂexibility in response to a volatile economic environment, and
(3) economies of scale in the provision of specialized services. They found support for
the ﬁrst hypothesis in the case of janitorial services, for the second hypothesis in the case
of accounting services, and for the third hypothesis in the cases of machine maintenance
services, engineering and drafting services, accounting services and computer services.
They concluded that the main reason for the growth of outsourcing was the increase
in the comparative advantage enjoyed by specialized service-providing establishments as
compared to in-house providers of the same services. Using an establishment survey con-
ducted in 1996, Houseman (2001) found that the most commonly cited reason for using
ﬂexible staﬃng arrangements was the need to accommodate ﬂuctuations in workload or
staﬀ absences.
Ad i ﬀerent hypothesis was proposed and tested by Autor (2001, 2002): Temporary
help ﬁrms gather and sell information about worker quality to the market, and skills
training plays a key role in the brokering of such information. The temporary help
ﬁrms oﬀer prospective employees a package of training and initially lower wages that
induces self-selection. Workers of high-perceived ability choose training in anticipation
of a steeper wage proﬁle while low ability workers are deterred by limited expected gains.
According to Autor (2002), the escalating use of temporary help workers in the U.S. labor
market reﬂects an increase in employer demand for worker screening in response to the
growth of unjust dismissal doctrine that has raised employer costs of terminating workers.
Magnani (2002) considers whether technological diﬀusion is responsible for the
growth of labor outsourcing. She presents a theoretical framework that shows that
as the technologies of the ﬁrm and the economy converge, outsourcing becomes more
3attractive.3 Using data on 18 two-digit industries in the U.S. for the time period 1949-
1999, she ﬁnds empirical evidence in support of her hypothesis. In the next section we
present a fully articulated model that more clearly explains the relationship between
technological change and outsourcing. Unlike Magnani (2002), we diﬀerentiate between
users’ and producers’ technologies and between levels and rates of technological change.
The model shows why the outsourcing decision for diﬀerent types of services will respond
diﬀerently to technological change and hence why an empirical analysis cannot rely on an
aggregate measure of purchased services but must look at diﬀerent categories of services.
3 A Model of Outsourcing
3.1 The Demand for Outsourcing
Consider a ﬁrm using conventional factors of production jointly with an amount s of a
service to produce an amount q of a ﬁnal good. We assume that the production technol-
ogy is of ﬁxed proportions so that input quantities—including the service—are proportional
to output, i.e.,
s = αq (1)
The ﬁrm hires the conventional factors in the market but has the option to produce
the service in-house. For simplicity, we constrain the ﬁrm to make an all-or-nothing
decision regarding the service: it either produces s in-house or outsources it. As in Ono
(2000), the ﬁrm will choose the option that minimizes the cost of obtaining the service.
T h eu n i tc o s to fproducing in-house an amount s of the service is c(s). The unit
cost of outsourcing the service is composed of p, the price of the service in the market,
and a ﬁrm-speciﬁcc o s tu ≥ 0, per unit of service, reﬂecting other internal costs related
to outsourcing (see below). For a given service, the price p is the same to all ﬁrms but u
varies across ﬁrms: there is heterogeneity in the cost of outsourcing.4 The distribution of
3Another study that considers the relationship between technological change and outsourcing is Baker
and Hubbard (2003) who show that, in the trucking industry, information technology that improves
coordination leads to less vertical integration while information technology that improves monitoring
leads to an increase in vertical integration.
4Alternatively, and with identical results, we could have allowed for heterogeneity in the in-house
4u across ﬁrms is given by G(u). Thus, the unit cost of the service in the market is p+u.
If a ﬁrm decides to buy the service in the market we say that the ﬁrm is outsourcing the
service.
The term u could be interpreted as an adjustment cost related to outsourcing.
These costs may be caused by the less than perfect match between the in-house workers
and the external workers resulting in misunderstandings, frictions, delivery lags, quality
diﬀerences, etc.5 The more “speciﬁc” or idiosyncratic the ﬁrm’s technology and mode of
production, the higher these costs would be, making outsourcing more costly. Put diﬀer-
ently, the more “global” the ﬁrm’s operation is, the lower will u be and outsourcing will
be less costly. The cost u may also represent something more abstract as the disutilities
associated with losing control over the production process.6
In this simple model, a ﬁrm will outsource the service, indicated by Y =1 , when
t h eu n i tc o s to fo u t s o u r c i n gi sl e s st h a nt h eu n i tc o s to fi n - h o u s ep r o d u c t i o n ,p+u<c (s).
The probability that a ﬁrm using an amount s of the service will outsource is
P(Y =1 )=G(c(s) − p) (2)
The term c(s)−p is the threshold level of the adjustment cost u. Firms with u above
this threshold choose not to outsource the service. Suppose the price of the service p is
less than c(s) for some s. If we do not allow for heterogeneity in the cost of outsourcing
then all ﬁrms of size q = s
α would be either outsourcing or producing in-house which is
in general contrary to the facts. It is the presence of heterogeneity in the service-speciﬁc
costs u that makes some ﬁrms prefer in-house production of some services even though
it is “cheaper” to outsource.
The model implies that if c decreases with s so does the probability of outsourcing.
In other words, if larger ﬁrms have a cost advantage in producing in-house services
cost function c(s).
5According to the W.E. Upjohn Institute’s Employer Survey on Flexible Staﬃng Policies (Houseman,
1997), 31% of the businesses that brought work previously contracted out back in house did so because
of their inability to maintain product or service quality using outside contractors.
6Information leakage appears to play an important role in organizational structure. In ﬁrms where
conﬁdentiality is important outsourcing is likely to be more costly (Baccara, 2003).
5then they are less likely to outsource them. To isolate the factors relating size to the
probability of outsourcing we assume that total costs of producing s are composed of
a ﬁxed cost ζ and a variable cost which is proportional to s. Thus, the unit cost of





We now introduce technical change in the production of the service. This form
of technical change reduces c, the unit (variable) cost of producing the service. These
cost-reducing innovations arrive every T periods. After τ innovations arrived, the unit






τ=1 is a sequence of decreasing numbers.
To avoid unnecessary complexities, we make two simplifying assumptions. First,
every time an innovation arrives the ﬁrm makes an “in-house/outsourcing” decision for
the next T periods, until the next innovation arrives. Thus, the decision on the 1st
innovation is made at time T, the decision on the 2nd o n ea tt i m e2T and so on. The
model is static because the outsourcing decisions today do not aﬀect future states.7 The
second simplifying assumption is that old innovations are retired from the market when
a new innovation arrives. In other words, at any point in time only the “leading edge”
technology is used (as in Aghion et al. (2000)). The duration of new technologies is T.
Thus, if a ﬁrm wishes to produce the service in-house it must adopt the latest innovation.8
7Dynamics can be introduced by allowing the production costs to depend on previous decisions.
8Suppose we do not assume full depreciation of the old technology. Take a ﬁrm that has been
producing the service in-house. When a new innovation arrives the ﬁrm has three options: it can
continue producing in-house with the old technology, it can adopt the innovation and produce in-house
or it can outsource the service (using the leading edge technology). Suppose the cost reduction embedded
in the new technology is large enough for the ﬁrm to always prefer adopting the new innovation than to
continuing using the old technology. Then the ﬁrm faces essentially two choices: outsource or in-house
production with the new technology. Thus, the assumption that only the leading edge technology is
used is an assumption about the size of the innovation steps.
Suppose that the cost reduction is not large enough. Then using the old technology in-house may
be the most proﬁtable option. Since cost reductions cumulate over time, at some point adopting the
new technology will be preferred to continue using the old one. At this point we are back to the model
analyzed in the paper. So outsourcing may be delayed when old technologies are not retired. Also cycles
6Adopting the latest innovation costs A, so that the per-period cost is A
T (a zero
discount rate is assumed) bringing the total cost of producing one unit of the service








The ﬁnal good producer decides at time τT whether to adopt the τth innovation
and produce in-house at a unit cost (4) per period for the next T periods, or outsource
the service at a per-period cost p+u. The (conditional) probability of outsourcing when
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There are N ﬁnal producers in an industry diﬀering only with respect to the value
of the adjustment cost u. The demand for outsourcing the service at a price p equals the





αq + cτ − p, multiplied
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(5)
This formulation captures two contrasting eﬀects of technological change on the
demand for outsourcing. First, as the level of technology τ increases, the cost of produc-
ing in-house decreases making outsourcing less desirable. Second, as the pace at which
technology changes increases (a decrease in T) the costs of adopting the latest technology
and producing in-house go up, making outsourcing more attractive. We will show later
on that only this second eﬀect is relevant in equilibrium.
Notice that shifts in G can potentially explain changes over time in the demand for
outsourcing. Autor’s ( 2001) argument that employment agencies are increasingly being
used as a screening device to screen high-ability workers can be interpreted as a likely
decline in the non-pecuniary costs of outsourcing labor u. This means an upward shift
between in-house production (with the old and new technologies) and outsourcing may be possible in
this case, unnecessarily complicating the model.
7of the G distribution over time.9 Consequently, demand for labor outsourcing through
employment agencies increases. Thus, over-time variations in G can potentially explain
variations in outsourcing rates over time.
3.2 The Supply of Outsourced Services
We assume that a single ﬁrm provides the service.10 This supplier does not enjoy a tech-
nological advantage in the production of the service relative to the ﬁnal good producer,
nor does it beneﬁtd i ﬀerently from technological change. In fact, we assume that the
production cost of the supplying ﬁrm is the same as the cost of producing in-house,
equation (4).11
The service provider takes the demand function (5) as given and chooses the price
that maximizes per-period proﬁts. These proﬁts, net of the per-period innovation adop-
tion costs, are














I nt h eA p p e n d i xw ep r o v e
Proposition 1 Assume G is continuous and twice diﬀerentiable with density g satisfying
−2g(a + cτ − p)+( p − cτ)g
0(a + cτ − p) < 0 for p ∈ (cτ,a+ cτ) (7)
Then the unique proﬁt maximizing price is given by the solution to
pτ − cτ =
G(a + cτ − pτ)
g(a + cτ − pτ)
(8)
9We later show that certain types of technological change can have similar eﬀects.
10We use monopoly to simplify the analysis. Competition among supplies reduces the price margin,
p − c, increasing the demand for outsourcing. Ono (2000) analyzes the entry of service providers into a
market and ﬁnds that larger markets induce more entry of suppliers leading to a lower price p and more
outsourcing.
11The assumption that ﬁnal good producers and service supplier have the same production technology
is not a serious restriction. If anything, the provider of the service should be more eﬃcient because it
enjoys other types of cost advantages due, for example, to specialization and learning. Autor (2001),
for example, emphasizes the general training provided by THS agencies to their employees. Introducing
such diﬀerences in production technologies will magnify the incentives for outsourcing. Although the
driving force of the model is the ability to exploit increasing returns in the production of services due to





αq is the average ﬁxed cost.
T h eo p t i m a lp r i c eb a l a n c e st h ei n c e n t i v e st or a i s ep r i c e sa n di n c r e a s ep r o ﬁts from
the services provided to the inframarginal ﬁnal producers, ∆p × NαqG(a + cτ − p),
and the lost proﬁts from the decision of N × ∆p × g(a + cτ − p) to switch to in-house
production, (p − cτ)Nαq[∆p × g(a + cτ − p)].
The second order condition (7) ensures concavity of the proﬁt function and there-
fore uniqueness of the solution. The second order condition is always satisﬁed by all
non-increasing densities (e.g., uniform and exponential) but also by some parametriza-
tion of the Pareto and other distributions.
By selling the service to more than one ﬁnal good producer, the monopoly realizes
the economies of scale resulting from the presence of a ﬁx e dc o s ti nt h ep r o d u c t i o no f
the service. This lowers the average unit cost of production which enables the monopoly
to set a price low enough to induce some ﬁnal good producers to outsource and still high
enough to make a positive net proﬁt .F r o m( 6 )i ti sc l e a rt h a tpτ must satisfy
a
NG(a + cτ − pτ)
+ cτ <p τ <a+ cτ
In other words, the size of the market N has to be large enough for the cost
saving due to scale economies to be substantial. Although the price that exists in the
outsourcing market is independent of N (but not of q), the viability of such a market
depends on whether at the best possible price, net positive proﬁts can be made.
The following example is helpful for motivating the model. Suppose the service in
question is a clerical job that requires one computer-skilled person. The ﬁnal good ﬁrm
needs to hire one instructor to train this worker. The hiring and ﬁring processes involve
a ﬁxed cost. The same instructor, however, can possibly train more than one person
simultaneously without incurring additional costs. In this example, it is the combination
of a ﬁxed cost and excess capacity (of the instructor) that gives rise to returns to scale.
This is precisely the feature being exploited by temporary employment agencies: they
train their workers in basic computer skills and oﬀer them to ﬁrms at a cost lower than
it would have cost the ﬁrm to train the workers itself.
9More generally, and in a temporal setting, some tasks are performed infrequently by
ﬁrms (training, repairs, maintenance, bookkeeping, etc.). If such tasks are performed by
dedicated employees of the ﬁrm, these workers will be idle substantial amounts of time.
If such tasks are performed at diﬀerent times in diﬀerent ﬁrms, the outsourcing ﬁrm can
perform all of these tasks and charge a lower price than the in-house cost because it uses
the same workers continuously, thereby lowering the average ﬁxed cost of production.
Technological diﬀusion provides another example of the economies to scale that
can arise in this context. Suppose now that not all ﬁrms adopt the new technologies at
t h es a m et i m e .S o m eﬁrms adopt the τth innovation at τT and the rest adopt T periods
later, at(τ +1 )T (we assume that the supplier can keep the innovation for 2T periods).
Thus, we have early and late adopters: diﬀusion of the τ technology. In this situation,
the service provider spreads the same ﬁx e dc o s t so v e ral o n g e rp e r i o do ft i m et h a nt h e
individual ﬁrm, 2T instead of T.
In an industry with N identical producers, the amount of service outsourced as a
share of ﬁnal good output is
D(a,cτ)
Nq
≡ σ(a,cτ)=αG(a + cτ − p(a,cτ)) (9)
where p(a,cτ) is the the equilibrium price.
The eﬀect of a change in the unit ﬁxed cost a =
A
T +ζ
αq on the share of outsourcing
is straightforward. In the Appendix we prove the following proposition




An increase in the unit ﬁxed cost a makes in-house production less attractive.
Thus, demand for outsourcing increases. Since the marginal cost of the provider is
constant, the quantity outsourced increases.12 This result generates two predictions.
First, the production scale q of the ﬁnal good producers aﬀects the level of outsourcing
12Without additional restrictions on G we do not know what happens to price. We do know, however,
that if it increases it increases by less than the change in a. See the appendix.
10(through a).L a r g e rﬁnal good producers have lower unit ﬁxed costs in the production of
the service and this makes outsourcing less attractive. This means that industries with
larger ﬁrms should exhibit lower outsourcing shares.13 This prediction is veriﬁed by the
Abraham and Taylor (1996) study on ﬁrms’ use of outside contractors: in four out of the
ﬁve services analyzed (machine maintenance services, engineering and drafting services,
accounting services and computer services) economies of scale are an important factor
in the decision to contract out.14
Second, an increase in the ﬁxed production cost ζ makes outsourcing more attrac-
tive. As a result quantity outsourced increases. Autor (2002) argues that part of the
trend towards outsourcing of labor services by hiring workers through employment agen-
cies can be explained by the increasingly higher costs of ﬁring in-house workers. This
argument is captured in our model by increases in ζ over time.
4 Technological Change and Outsourcing
How does technological change in the production of the service aﬀect outsourcing?
Uniqueness of the solution to (8) in Proposition 1 implies that any change in the mar-
ginal cost of production c is matched by a corresponding change in price. This keeps the
price margin pτ − cτ constant. This observation implies that the level of technology τ
and the share of outsourcing are independent.
Because of a constant price margin, the set of outsourcing ﬁrms, i.e., those satis-
fying u ≤ a + cτ − pτ, does not change as technology improves over time. Demand for
outsourcing is constant over technology states (and time). Even though the ﬁnal good
producers produce the service at a lower cost due to the improvement in technology and,
consequently, their demand for outsourcing declines with τ, the service supplier also re-
13The total quantity of services outsourced, however, may be larger in industries with larger ﬁrms
because, even though less ﬁrms are outsourcing, those that do outsource, outsource a larger amount of
the service.
14However, Ono (2000) ﬁnds that larger plants are more likely to outsource. She points out that
this may indicate the possible existence of economies of scale arising from the ﬁxed costs in service
transactions, such as contract costs. Or it may indicate that larger plants may have more power in
negotiating prices with service providers.
11duces its production cost. The new equilibrium price declines by the same amount as
the decline in the marginal cost of producing the service and therefore the incentives to
outsource do not change. This means that the level of technology has no eﬀect on the
quantity of service outsourced.15
Even though the level of technology has no intrinsic implications for outsourcing,
the pace at which technology evolves does. As the pace of technological change is accel-
erated, T decreases and a increases. Thus, the per-period unit cost of producing in-house
increases and this shifts the demand for outsourcing outwards at any price. Shortening
the time horizon of the new technology increases its per-period ﬁxed costs making them
more expensive to use. The ﬁnal good ﬁr mi sf a c e dw i t ha ni n c r e a s ei nt h em a r g i n a lc o s t
of a make-or-buy decision. The supplier of the service, on the other hand, does not face
any change in its marginal cost of producing the service. Thus the equilibrium quantity
of outsourcing increases.
Thus it is not the level of the technology per-se but the frequency of its arrival
that matters. This is the channel through which technological change aﬀects outsourcing.
The incentives to outsource are magniﬁed the faster technologies change because, through
outsourcing, the ﬁrm can use the latest technologies without incurring the ﬁxed costs of
adopting them.
We summarize the two results in
Proposition 3 The level of technology in the production of the service does not aﬀect
outsourcing, but a faster pace of technological change increases outsourcing.
If technological improvements are more frequent in bookkeeping than in janitorial
services then, ceteris paribus, the share of bookkeeping outsourcing will be larger. If im-
provements arrive at the same speed, and all other parameters are equal, the outsourcing
shares of both services should also be the same even though the technological level in
bookkeeping may be higher than in janitorial services. Because diﬀerent services rely on
15This is because both sides of the market face the same cost reductions. Of course, this not need be
the case. If, as Porter (1998) puts it: “Outside specialists are often more cost eﬀective and responsive
than in-house units...”, then they may be more likely to adopt the latest technologies and outsourcing
will be more attractive.
12diﬀerent technologies, and these may have been diﬀusing at diﬀerent speeds, the model
can potentially explain diﬀerent time patterns in outsourcing.
The Censuses of Manufactures provide information on eight Selected Purchased
Services: repair of buildings and other structures, repair of machinery, communication
services, legal services, accounting and bookkeeping services, advertising, software and
data processing services, and refuse removal. The data are available at the four-digit
SIC level in 1992 and at the seven-digit NAICS level in 1997.16 T a b l e1s h o w st h er a t i o
of purchased services to total value added in 1992 and 1997 averaged across industries
while the third column reports the change in the outsourcing shares between 1992 and
1997. The manufacturing sector’s spending on outsourced services as a percentage of
value-added more than doubled during that ﬁve-year period. Spending on some services
increased at an even faster rate, notably accounting and bookkeeping services and com-
munication services where the increases are 14 and 8 times, respectively, in just ﬁve years!
Our model predicts that we should observe a positive correlation between the pace of
technological change in service production and expenditures on the outsourcing of those
services. Unfortunately, we are unable to test this prediction because time-series data on
changes in the IT-intensity of the various services listed in Table 1 are not available.17
161992 is the earliest year for which detailed data on purchased services are provided. 1992 data
were classiﬁed based on the Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (SIC) system rather than the new North
American Industry Classiﬁcation System (NAICS) used in 1997. We aggregated both datasets to four-
digit SIC, following the Census guidelines to “bridge” between the NAICS and SIC codes. Weights for
aggregation were based on value of shipments.
17The only available data on IT investments by service producers for both 1992 and 1997 are from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis’s report “Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods 1925-2001”. But
the service categories from the Census of Manufacturers are much more detailed than the categories
used by the BEA making it impossible to identify changes in IT-intensity for the detailed services shown
in Table 1 (the exceptions are legal services and telephone services). For example, in the BEA, the
category “Business Services” includes advertising services and computer programming services, but it
also includes consumer credit reporting agencies, mailing, reproduction, commercial art, photography
and stenographic services, services to dwellings, miscellaneous equipment rental and leasing, and per-
sonnel supply services. The category “Other Services” includes accounting and bookkeeping services,
museums, botanical and zoological gardens, membership organizations, engineering and management
services, and private households. “Miscellaneous Repair Services” includes machinery services, TV and
radio repairs, electric equipment repairs, watch repairs, and furniture services.
135 Users’ Technology and Outsourcing
Another channel through which technological change can aﬀect outsourcing is through
improvements in the technologies used by ﬁnal good ﬁrms. One of the distinguishing
features of modern economies during the past two decades is the development and adop-
tion of innovations in the area of information technology (IT). Here we analyze whether
investment in IT by ﬁnal good ﬁrms is conducive to more outsourcing.
The use of computer technology is pervasive across all sectors of the modern econ-
omy. Many aspects of the technology are essentially similar across ﬁrms and industries
and this is changing the nature and numbers of jobs within economic organizations.18
Thus, an important feature of the new information technologies of the 1990s is that they
are relatively intensive in their requirement of general skills; skills that can be easily
transferred across ﬁrms and sectors (e.g., database programmers). The IT content of
both the services and of the production technology at the ﬁrms using the services gen-
erates a technological compatibility between the ﬁrm’s use of its own technology and the
ability to use others’ technologies.
For our purposes, we interpret the eﬀects of IT as inducing changes in the distribu-
tion of the adjustment costs, u. We denote the technology used by the ﬁnal good ﬁrm in
production by an index ω such that the higher ω, the higher the IT content of the ﬁrm’s
production technology.19 The distribution of adjustment cost u is now parameterized by
ω,
G(u;ω)
The notion of technological compatibility leads to the hypothesis that more IT-
intensive ﬁrms face (stochastically) lower adjustment costs of outsourcing,
18This should be contrasted to past innovations which aﬀected speciﬁc occupations and industries.
Machine tool automation, for example, aﬀected production jobs in manufacturing only (McConnell,
1996).
19Thus, we diﬀerentiate between the technology used in the production of the service, previously
denoted by τ, and the technology level of the ﬁnal good producer, ω. The level of the service technology
may also be assumed to have an eﬀect on the distribution of adjustment costs but we abstract from
this here since we do not have technology data at the service level and, therefore, cannot test these





Inequality (10) implies that demand for outsourcing a given service increases with
the IT content of ﬁnal good producers. For some services, i.e., janitorial services, tech-




For these type of services, there should not be signiﬁcant variations in the share
of outsourcing across ﬁrms diﬀering in their technological level (after controlling for all
other factors aﬀecting demand). Nor should there be any signiﬁcant variation over time
as the ﬁrm invests in IT. On the other hand, the demand for services such as labor
outsourcing via employment agencies that provide workers with computing and other
general skills should increase over time as these workers are bundled with more IT and
the ﬁnal producers themselves rely on more IT-based technologies. In other words, the
plausible complementarity between the IT-level of the service and the IT-level of the
user implies that the reduction in user costs is larger for more IT-intensive services.
Let θ =( a,c,ω) be the vector of parameters and p(θ) the equilibrium price of
the service. Obviously, the equilibrium analysis is the same as in the previous Section.
We are now interested in examining the change in the outsourced share when the users’
technology changes. In general, the eﬀect of the technology parameters cannot be signed
because (10) imposes no restrictions on the change in the slope of the demand function.
We therefore assume that the proportional increase in G d u et oa ni n c r e a s ei nω increases
with u or, equivalently, decreases with p. More precisely, we assume that for ω0 >ωand






for all u ∈ [0,a] (11)
That is, the proportional change in G caused by an increase in ω is non-decreasing
in u, at least for u ∈ [0,a]. This is a plausible assumption because all cumulative density
15functions pass through 0 at u =0irrespective of the value of the parameter ω. As u
increases, the diﬀerence between the cumulative density functions must increase in the
neighborhood of 0. We require that the increase is large enough so as to guarantee a
proportional increase. This property has to hold only in a part of the support of u,
namely [0,a]. Because the diﬀerence between the cumulative density functions tends to
disappears as u approaches inﬁnity we need to think of a as being well below that point.
The outsourcing share is
σ(θ)=αG(a + cτ − p(θ);τ,ω) (12)
Proposition 4 Under assumption (11), price decreases with ω and outsourcing in-
creases with ω.
See the Appendix for a proof. Intuitively, when ω changes the only eﬀect is an
increase in demand; the marginal cost curve of the service provider does not change.
Thus, the outsourced share increases. Because the increase in ω “brings in” more ﬁrms
in the higher range of adjustment cost it pays the service provider to lower prices and
service these ﬁrms.
Notice that (11) is a suﬃcient condition. In the Appendix we present an example
where the weak inequality in (11) is not satisﬁed but nevertheless the price decreases
and outsourcing increases.
Is there any empirical evidence that more IT-intensive ﬁnal goods producers are
more likely to purchase outside services? We examine this issue using the industry-level
data from the 1992 and 1997 Censuses of Manufactures. Our basic estimating equation
is:
(PurchasedService)ijt = Xijtβ + δITit + µij + εijt (13)
where ITit is a measure of the information technology intensity in industry i at time
period t, subscript j is a service index, Xijt is a vector of control variables, and µij is an
industry-service ﬁxed eﬀect.
16Although in our theoretical model the ﬁrm makes an all-or-nothing decision con-
cerning the outsourcing of any given service, our data only report industry level spending
on various services. We therefore use as our dependent variable the log of average dollars
per ﬁrm spent in industry i on service j at time t and account for scale eﬀects by includ-
ing the log of value added in the industry as an independent variable. We recognize that
a preferred empirical measure of outsourcing would be the industry’s expenditures on
the outsourcing of a given service as a percentage of total expenditures on that service
(in-house and outsourced combined). Unfortunately, such data are not available and our
dependent variable may reﬂect inter-industry heterogeneity that is unrelated to hetero-
geneity in outsourcing. Hence, we may be less likely to ﬁnd a signiﬁcant relationship
between outsourcing expenditures and technological change. In order to account for
industry ﬁxed eﬀects that may be correlated with the regressors, we also estimate the
model in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Our main independent variable is the IT-intensity of the industry. We measure
IT-intensity by using the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) detailed data on capital
investment and calculate the ratio of IT investment to total capital investment.20 IT
investment includes computer hardware (mainframes, personal computers, storage de-
vices, printers, terminals, tape drives and integrated systems) and computer software
(prepackaged, custom, and own-account). These data are available on a two-digit SIC
level only. Because the dependent variable is at the four-digit SIC level, we allow for
arbitrary correlation in εijt (or µij + εijt) within groups of industries belonging to the
same two-digit SIC classiﬁcation by computing standard errors clustered at the two-digit
SIC classiﬁcation. In our cross-sectional analysis for 1992, we are also able to use an
alternative measure of IT-intensity available at the four-digit SIC level. This variable,
the ratio of investments in computers divided by total investments in new machinery
and equipment, can be calculated from the 1992 Census of Manufacturers but was not
available in 1997.
The vector X contains a variety of variables that are likely to aﬀect spending on
20Stiroh (2002) used these data to compare the productivity eﬀects of IT capital and non-IT capital.
17outsourcing. The variables, discussed in detail in the Data Appendix, are: (1) value-
added; (2) the share of wage payments in total value added; (3) a proxy for the seasonality
of the industry’s workload; (4) annual payroll divided by the number of employees in the
four-digit industry, calculated from the Census of Manufacturers; (5) average years of
schooling in the three-digit industry; (6) percentage of workers in the industry who are
unionized; (7) the Herﬁndahl —Hirshman index; and (8) the average number of employees
per establishment, calculated from the Census of Manufacturers.
Table 2 reports the estimated coeﬃcients of the IT-intensity variable in equation
(13) estimated separately for each of the eight purchased services in each year (1992 and
1997) and in ﬁrst diﬀerences.21 Two sets of results are reported for 1992: column (1) uses
the data from the Census of Manufacturers to calculate the industry’s IT-intensity while
column (2) uses the data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. In the cross-sectional
regressions, we do observe positive eﬀects (although not always signiﬁcant) for those
services where we would expect that an increased use of IT by ﬁnal goods producers will
reduce the adjustment costs of outsourcing business services such as communications,
legal services, accounting and bookkeeping, advertising and software. The adjustment
costs of outsourcing services such as buildings repair, machine repair and refuse services
a r eu n l i k e l yt ob ea ﬀected by the ﬁnal goods producer’s use of IT and we should not
observe any IT eﬀect there. In fact, for these services we observe negative and signiﬁcant
IT eﬀects which are not consistent with the model’s predictions.
The latter cross-sectional ﬁnding may be due to the fact that more traditional
industries have relatively large shares of these services but lower investments in IT. Es-
timating equation (13) in ﬁrst diﬀerences controls for this and other types of unobserved
industry eﬀects. The results are now in line with the model’s predictions: the outsourc-
ing of communications, accounting and bookkeeping, and software services are positively
and signiﬁcantly related to the IT-intensity of the using ﬁrm. These are precisely the
services where one would expect (10) to hold in a strict sense. The number of negative IT
coeﬃcients is greatly reduced and none is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Speciﬁcally,
21The coeﬃcients on the other variables in equation (13) are shown in Appendix Tables 2-a through
2-c.
18and as expected, the outsourcing of buildings repair, machine repair and refuse services
are unrelated to the IT-intensity of the ﬁnal goods producer.
To gain an idea of the magnitude of the eﬀects, consider the following thought
experiment using the coeﬃcients from the ﬁrst-diﬀerence speciﬁcation in Table 2 (see
Appendix Table 1 for means and standard deviations). A one standard deviation in-
crease in the ﬁrst-diﬀerence value of IT-intensity (or 3.84 percentage points) leads to
an increase in ﬁrst-diﬀerence log expenditures on outsourced communication services of
.1044 (measured in thousands of dollars), or 13 percent of the standard deviation of the
dependent variable. Similar calculations for the outsourcing of accounting/bookkeeping
services and software services result in impacts that each equal 8 percent of the standard
deviations of the dependent variable.
The coeﬃc i e n t so nt h eo t h e rv a r i a b l e si ne q u a t i o n( 1 3 )a r es h o w ni nt h eA p p e n d i x
Tables 2a — 2c. Focusing on the ﬁrst diﬀerence results in Table 2c, we see that the
only variables that are signiﬁcant are “Seasonality” and the “Wage Share”. The latter
variable was used to control for the fact that industries that are more labor-intensive
will be more likely to outsource labor; it is positive and signiﬁcant in seven of the
nine regressions. Seasonality is positive and signiﬁcant for ﬁve services (building repair,
machine repair, legal services, advertising and refuse services). These are the services
for which IT-intensity did not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect; the decision to outsource these
services appears to be driven by the seasonality of demand for the industry’s product.
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we propose that an important source of the recent increase in labor out-
sourcing among manufacturing ﬁrms is technological change. We develop a model that
shows that the level of technology in the service industry alone (i.e., the introduction
of lower cost technology) cannot predict an increase in outsourcing without making ad-
ditional assumptions. We show, however, that an increase in the pace of technological
change will increase outsourcing. The lack of data on the pace of technological change
across services prevents us from testing directly this prediction.
19Technological change in the using ﬁrms, however, can have an eﬀect on outsourcing
if it can reduce the adjustment costs of outsourcing. This is particularly important
because the recent wave of technological change based on new information technologies
of the 1990s is relatively intensive in its requirement of general skills; skills that can be
easily transferred across ﬁrms and sectors. We posit that the IT content of both the
services and of the production technology at the ﬁrms using the services generates a
technological compatibility between the ﬁrm’s use of its own technology and the ability
to use others’ technologies. This compatibility tends to reduce the adjustment costs
of outsourcing, thereby increasing the demand for outsourced services. We test this
prediction using data from the 1992 and 1997 Censuses of Manufacturers. Consistent
with our model, we ﬁnd that as ﬁnal good producers increase their reliance on IT, they
are more likely to purchase outside services.
These ﬁndings are potentially important because they imply that labor outsourcing
will increase over time as information technology becomes more pervasive in the economy.
Our empirical analysis is based on the available industry-level data which are not ideal
for our purposes. We view our empirical ﬁndings as suggestive evidence which needs to
be reﬁned once better data on outsourcing and technological change become available.
20Table 1. Industry Average Spending on Outsourcing∗
Type of Service 1992 1997 1997
1992
All Purchased Services 4.25% 10.68% 2.51
Accounting & Bookkeeping 0.14% 1.95% 13.93
Communications 0.35% 2.82% 8.06
Advertising 0.87% 2.41% 2.77
Refuse Services 0.33% 0.43% 1.30
Software Services 0.28% 0.35% 1.25
Machine Repair 1.69% 2.09% 1.24
Legal Services 0.28% 0.32% 1.14
Buildings Repair 0.40% 0.32% 0.80
∗As percentage of total value added
21Table 2. The Eﬀects of IT Intensity on Diﬀerent Purchased Services
Industry level regressions (equation (13))
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Type of Service 1992 1992 1997 Diﬀerenced Data
(4-digit IT measure) (1997 - 1992)
All Purchased -.589 -.951∗ -.912∗ .482
Services (.365) (.538) (.494) (.932)
Buildings Repair -1.34∗∗ -1.52∗∗∗ -1.26∗∗∗ -.021
(.594) (.636) (.504) (1.18)
Machine Repair -4.09∗∗∗ -3.78∗∗∗ -2.88∗∗∗ -.972
(.725) (1.08) (.927) (834)
Communications 1.25∗∗∗ .718∗∗ 1.37∗∗∗ 2.72∗∗∗
(.391) (.356) (.428) (1.02)
Legal Services 1.15∗ .687 .520 .891
(.621) (.731) (.544) (1.33)
Accounting & .958∗∗ .164 .616 2.08∗
Bookkeeping (.476) (.305) (.426) (1.28)
Advertising 3.54∗∗∗ 4.08∗∗∗ 2.49∗∗∗ .311
(.952) (.744) (.776) (1.21)
Software Services 2.36∗∗∗ 1.727∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 2.16∗
(.523) (.536) (.566) (1.19)
Refuse Services -4.44∗∗∗ -4.69∗∗∗ -2.46∗∗∗ 1.08
(.737) (.765) (.819) (2.56)
Notes: Data source for IT-intensity in col. (1) is 1992 Census of Manufacturers. In
all other columns, the data source is the BEA. IT intensity is measured as the
ratio of IT investment to total capital investment. The dependent variable is in logs.
Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parentheses.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.
22Appendix
A Data Appendix
The main data sources for our empirical analysis are the 1992 and 1997 Annual Sur-
veys of Manufactures. The 1992 data were classiﬁed based on the Standard Industrial
Classiﬁcation (SIC) system rather than the new North American Industry Classiﬁcation
System (NAICS) used in 1997. We aggregated both data sets into 4-digit SIC, follow-
ing the Census guidelines to “bridge” between the NAICS and SIC codes. Weights for
aggregations were based on value of shipment.
The original 1997 ﬁle is extracted from a CD produced by the Census Bureau
(E9731I3) “Manufacturing: Detailed Statistics by Industry, 1997”. The universe of this
ﬁle is “all operating establishments with one or more paid employees primarily engaged
in manufacturing”. This universe includes all establishments classiﬁed in the manufac-
turing North American Industrial Classiﬁcation System (NAICS), Codes 311111 through
339999. The data are shown at the 6-digit NAICS code level, and for selected industries
at the 7-digit (sub-industry) level. The ﬁle E97b1.dta (obtained from the census web
site) was used to collapse this data into 4-digit SIC code. A weight was computed using
the variable "value".
The data contains detailed industry statistics, including data on the number of
establishments, employment, payroll, materials, value of shipments, value added, in-
ventories, assets, and capital expenditures. The statistics on Purchased Services were
collected on a sampled basis, and are therefore subject to sampling errors.
The original 1992 ﬁle is extracted from several ﬁles produced by the Census Bureau.
The data ﬁles were: Supplemental Statistics, ASM, Assets, and Industry Statistics from
Manufacturing Industries. The 1992 data is aggregated at a 4-digit SIC code.
Once the 1992 and the 1997 data were merged by 4-digit SIC codes, they were
further collapsed into 3-digit and 2-digit formats, using values of shipments as weights
in order to allow matching with variables that were available at diﬀerent levels of aggre-
23gations. Our main data set is, however, at 4-digit SIC level of aggregation.
In 1997 we exclude NAICS 323110 (Commercial lithographic printing), which is
linked to the following SIC codes: 2752, 2771, and 3999. The values for most services in
this industry seem to be in error. The census bureau conﬁrmed our observation.
Deﬁnition of Purchased Services
Establishments responding to the Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM) were
asked to provide information on the cost of purchased services for: (1) the repair of
buildings and other structures, (2) the repair of machinery, (3) communication services,
(4) legal services, (5) accounting and bookkeeping services, (6) advertising, (7) software
and other data processing services, and (8) refuse removal. Each of these items reﬂects
the costs paid directly by the establishment and excludes salaries paid to employees of
the establishment for these services. The data on purchased services, as well as other
variables that are reported in dollar terms are in units of thousands of dollars. In the
regression analyses a log transformation was used.
Included in the cost of purchased services for the repair of buildings and machin-
ery are payments made for all maintenance and repair work on buildings and equipment.
Payments made to other establishments of the same company and for repair and mainte-
nance of any leased property also are included. Extensive repairs or reconstruction that
was capitalized is considered capital expenditures and is, therefore, excluded from this
item.
Repair and maintenance costs provided by an owner as part of a rental contract
or incurred directly by an establishment in using its own work force also are excluded.
Included in the cost of purchased advertising services are payments for printing,
media coverage, and other advertising services and materials. Included in the cost of pur-
chased software and other data processing services are all purchases by the establishment
from other companies.
Excluded are services provided by other establishments of the same company (such
as by a separate data processing unit). Included in the cost of purchased refuse removal
services are all costs of refuse removal services paid by the establishment, including costs
for hazardous waste removal or treatment. Excluded are all costs included in rental
24payments or as capital expenditures.
Measuring IT-intensity
We use the US bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) report on “Fixed Assets and
Consumer Durable Goods 1925-2001”. This publication reports, among other things,
“ﬁxed investment” which denote any addition to ﬁxed reproducible tangible wealth.
We calculate the ratio of investment in IT related items to total investment, excluding
investment in buildings and structure. The table below lists all the items that are
included in this calculation. This variable is aggregated at the 2 digit SIC level (We have




Direct access storage devices 
Computer printers 
Computer terminals 
Computer tape drives 









Photocopy and related equipment 
Office and accounting equipment 
Nuclear fuel rods 
Other fabricated metal products 
Steam engines 
Internal combustion engines 
Metalworking machinery 
Special industry machinery, n.e.c. 
General industrial machinery 
Electrical transmission & distribution 











Agricultural machinery, except tractors 
Construction machinery, except tractors 
Mining and oilfield machinery 
Service industry machinery 
Household appliances 
Other electrical equipment, n.e.c. 
Other nonresidential equipment 
 
 
In 1992, we also have an alternative measure of IT-intensity available from the
Census of Manufacturers, namely, the ratio of investments in computers divided by total
investment in new machinery and equipment.
Additional Variables and Data Sources
Other variables that were obtained from the 1992 and 1997 censuses of manufac-
turers include:
1. Log of value added: This measure of manufacturing activity is derived by sub-
tracting the cost of materials, supplies, containers, fuel, purchased electricity, and
25contract work from the value of shipment (products manufactured plus receipts of
service rendered).
2. Employees Per Establishment: Calculated as the average number of production
workers obtained at four speciﬁc pay periods during the year plus all other workers
at one given pay period.
3. Pay per Employee: Annual payroll (excluding fringe beneﬁts) divided by number
of employees.
4. Pay per Value Added: Annual payroll divided by value added.
5. Seasonality: We constructed a measure of industry level seasonality following Abra-
ham and Taylor (1996). The data source is BLS, the Current Employment Statistics
(CES) database. We ﬁrst run a regression of log change in employment by industry
(using monthly data) on monthly dummies, over ten years period (83-92 for the
92 survey and 83-97 for the 97 data). Then we took the standard deviation of the
monthly coeﬃcients by industry, which gives us our measure of seasonality. Using a
ﬁve years period, instead of ten, didn’t alter our results. This variable is computed
at 4 digit SIC level for 183 industries and at 3 digit SIC for 260 industries. (We
have a total of 458 categories at 4 digit SIC level).
6. Union Membership: Percentage of people unionized in the industry. This variable
is aggregated at the 3 digit SIC level for a total of 116 diﬀerent manufacturing
sectors. Source: Union & Earnings Data book (Hirsch and Macpherson, 1997),
Compilations from the CPS.
7. Schooling: Average years of schooling. Source: Union & Earnings Data book
(Hirsch and Macpherson, 1997), Compilations from the CPS. This variable is ag-
gregated at the 3 digit SIC level for a total of 116 diﬀerent manufacturing sectors.
8. HHI Index: The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Index, a commonly accepted measure of
market concentration. We use the Census Bureau 1992 and 1997 Census CD’s,
where the following procedure is used to calculate the index: Summing the squares
26of individual company percentages (value of shipments) for the 50 largest companies
or the universe, whichever is lower. For 1992 the index is reported at a 4 digit SIC
level and for 1997 it is reported at the 6 digit NAICS level. We converted it to SIC
by using the bridge procedure outlined by the Census Bureau.
B Appendix
B.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let H(p)=( p − c)G(a + c − p). The proﬁt-maximizing price should maximize H(p)
subject to non-negative proﬁts. Let z = p−c be the price margin. It is easier to analyze
t h ee q u i v a l e n tp r o b l e mo fm a x i m i z i n gH(z)=zG(a − z).zcannot be lower than 0 and
cannot be larger than a−otherwise demand for the service will be zero. Thus, optimal z
should be between 0 and a. Note that H(z) increases at z =0because H0(0) = G(a) > 0
and is non-increasing at z = a because H0(a)=−ag(0) ≤ 0 using G(0) = 0. Since H(z)
is continuous in [0,a] an interior solution exists. This solution satisﬁes
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Uniqueness of the solution is ensured if H(z) is strictly concave in (0,a), i.e., if
H
00(z) ≡ ∆ = −2g(a − z)+zg
0(a − z) < 0 (16)
As u ﬃcient condition for strict concavity is that zg(a − z) be increasing in (0,a).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 2
dσ(a,c)
da










g(a + c − p) − (p − c)g0(a + c − p)
∆






g(a + c − p)
∆
≥ 0




g2(a + c − p)
∆
≥ 0
B.3 Proof of Proposition 4
Let p0 be optimal for ω0 and p optimal for ω. Assume ω0 >ω .Proﬁt maximization implies
(p
0 − cτ)G(a + cτ − p
0;ω
0) ≥ (p − cτ)G(a + cτ − p;ω
0)
(p − cτ)G(a + cτ − p;τ,ω) ≥ (p
0 − cτ)G(a + cτ − p
0;ω)
Dividing appropriately we get
G(a + cτ − p0;τ,ω0)
G(a + cτ − p0;τ,ω)
≥
G(a + cτ − p;τ,ω0)
G(a + cτ − p;τ,ω)
Suppose p0 >p .Then, a + cτ − p0 <a+ cτ − p and this violates the Monotone
Probability Ratio assumption (11). Thus, we must have p0 ≤ p.
Because the outsourcing share is proportional to G(a + cτ − p0;τ,ω0) and ω0 >ω
and p0 ≤ p we get
G(a + cτ − p
0;τ,ω
0) ≥ G(a + cτ − p
0;τ,ω) ≥ G(a + cτ − p;τ,ω)
That is, σ(θ) is nondecreasing in ω.
B.4 Two Parametric Examples
B.4.1 Uniform Distribution





,κ 1,κ 2 ≥ 0. Then G(u|τ,ω)=ωκ1τκ2 u
u and
g(u)=ωκ1τκ2 1
u for 0 ≤ u ≤ u
ωκ1τκ2. When κ1 = κ2 =0t h e r ei sn ot e c h n o l o g i c a le ﬀect on





(a + cτ − p)
and the pricing decision is given by





































Note the following features of this parametrization:
1. The output level of the individual ﬁrm q does not aﬀect absolute demand for out-
sourcing. Although a higher q decreases the probability of outsourcing it also in-
creases the quantity actually outsourced and both eﬀects cancel each other. There-
fore, outsourcing in the industry as a share of ﬁnal output decreases with q.
2. When there is no technological eﬀect on G ( κ1 = κ2 =0 ) , outsourcing is not
aﬀected by τ but increases with T, the speed of technological change (Proposition
3).
3. When κ1 > 0, outsourcing is higher in industries with a high level of IT (Proposition
4).
4. When κ2 > 0, outsourcing is higher in services with a high level of IT.
5. There are complementarities between the ﬁnal producer’s and the service’s level of







29B.4.2 A More Flexible Distribution
Let G(u)=b(ku−u)γ where all parameters u,k,b,and γ are non-negative and
u









.22 The equilibrium price satisﬁes


































The eﬀect of changes in technology is introduced by letting the parameter k be
an increasing functions of ω and τ.After a suitable parametrization of k, outsourcing in
this more general example has the same properties as in the previous case. Alternatively,
we can let b be an increasing function of ω and τ. Interestingly, G does not satisfy the
monotone probability ratio with respect to changes in k. Nevertheless, price declines with
k while outsourced quantity increases.
22The density function g(u)=bkγ(ku−u)γ−1 is quite ﬂexible. When γ =1 , the uniform distribution
results. When γ<1, the density is declining in u and when γ>1 it is increasing in u.
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Appendix Table 1. Selected Means
Standard Deviations in Parentheses
1992 1997 1997-1992
IT Intensity .153 .237 .0839
(.0095) (.132) (.0384)
Ln Expenditures
(in thousands of $)
Buildings Repair 8.4597 8.63 .2196
(1.347) (1.42) (.753)
Machine Repair 9.86 10.02 .165
(1.41) (1.53) (.655)
Communications 8.59 8.67 .123
(1.187) (1.51) (.809)
Legal Services 8.149 8.08 -.0028
(1.357) (1.55) (.915)
Accounting & 7.674 7.659 .0059
Bookkeeping (1.228) (1.546) (.995)
Advertising 8.795 8.75 .0696
(1.709) (1.948) (1.06)
Software Services 7.828 7.94 .209
(1.449) (1.728) (.995)
Refuse Services 8.044 8.038 .024
(1.46) (1.568) (.91)
Notes:
I Ti n t e n s i t yi sm e a s u r e da st h er a t i oo fI T
investment to total capital investment
31Appendix Table 2-a: Estimated Coeﬃcients of Additional Regressors
1992 - OLS Regression Results
Union AvgSal Educ Seas Hhind Firm Wage Obs.
Size Share (R2)
All Purchased .007∗∗ .016∗∗ .044 .031 -.0003∗∗ .00005 -.087 357
Services (.0036) (.008) (.078) (1.28) (.00005) (.0002) (.575) (.865)
Buildings .0044 .022∗∗∗ .030 -1.56 .00002 .00012 1.49∗∗∗ 350
Repair (.005) (.008) (.96) (1.97) (.00006) (.0002) (.498) (.831)
Machine .0099 .040∗∗∗ -.104 -.858 -.00012 -.0004 -.237 351
Repair (.007) (.014) (.190) (2.70) (.0001) (.0003) (1.10) (.749)
Commun. -.0035 .0017 .157∗∗∗ -2.89∗∗∗ -.0003∗∗∗ -.0001 1.54∗∗∗ 347
(.0025) (.0057) (.044) (1.16) (.00006) (.0002) (.580) (.881)
Legal .0097 .0022 .222∗∗∗ -.872 -.00054∗∗∗ .00008 1.71∗∗∗ 351
Services (.0062) (.0124) (.106) (2.05) (.00007) (.0001) (.640) (.773)
Accounting & -.0003 -.009 .091 .329 -.0005∗∗∗ -.0006∗ 2.21∗∗∗ 345
Bookkeeping (.006) (.010) (.064) (1.70) (.00009) (.0003) (.374) (.678)
Advertising .0129 -.071∗∗∗ .290∗∗ 4.98 -.0006∗∗∗ -.0004 -2.54∗∗∗ 344
(.010) (.016) (.132) (3.81) (.00017) (.0003) (.881) (.583)
Software .0045 .029∗∗∗ .061 -4.16∗∗∗ -.00018∗ .0008∗∗∗ 2.182∗∗∗ 343
Services (.0048) (.0097) (.066) (1.72) (.0001) (.0002) (.770) (.785)
Refuse .009 .029 .078 -2.25 .0001 -.0007∗∗∗ 2.047∗ 348
Services (.008) (.018) (.103) (1.79) (.00008) (.0002) (1.11) (.746)
Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Not reported are the coeﬃcients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term
32Appendix Table 2-b: Estimated Coeﬃcients of Additional Regressors
1997 - OLS Regression Results
Union AvgSal Educ Seas Hhind Firm Wage Obs.
Size Share (R2)
All Purchased .002 .019∗∗∗ .079 1.55 -.0002∗∗∗ .00002 .885 350
Services (.004) (.005) (.084) (1.18) (.00007) (.0004) (.537) (.862)
Buildings .0007 .027∗∗∗ .0145 -1.08 -.00013 .0002 1.61∗∗∗ 348
Repair (.005) (.007) (.070) (1.96) (.00009) (.0004) (.414) (.832)
Machine .0075 .037∗∗∗ -.150 -1.28 -.0002 .0003 .630 347
Repair (.008) (.011) (.189) (3.93) (.00013) (.0006) (.854) (.751)
Commun. .0027 .0028 .123∗∗∗ -1.17 -.0002∗∗∗ -.0013∗∗∗ 2.289∗∗∗ 350
(.0049) (.0049) (.055) (1.18) (.00008) (.0003) (.573) (.829)
Legal -.0002 .0028 .255∗∗∗ .982 -.0003∗∗∗ -.0003 2.856∗∗∗ 347
Services (.0046) (.007) (.101) (1.80) (.00013) (.0006) (.874) (748)
Accounting & -.001 -.010 .185∗∗ 2.27 -.00047∗∗∗ -.0019∗∗∗ 3.016∗∗∗ 349
Bookkeeping (.005) (.007) (.089) (1.96) (.0001) (.0008) (.435) (.736)
Advertising .0066 -.058∗∗∗ .448∗∗∗ 6.75 -.0004∗∗∗ -.0033∗∗∗ -1.11 350
(.101) (.017) (.180) (5.53) (.00014) (.0008) (1.31) (614)
Software .0034 .024∗∗∗ .181∗ -.036 -.0002∗ -.0002 3.53∗∗∗ 349
Services (.004) (.005) (.094) (1.64) (.00011) (.0006) (.918) (.784)
Refuse .005 .0306∗∗∗ .0259 .412 -.00019 .00012 1.803∗∗ 349
Services (.005) (.0089) (.118) (2.65) (.00014) (.0006) (.898) (.768)
Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Not reported are the coeﬃcients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term
33Appendix Table 2-c: Estimated Coeﬃcients of Various Variables
1997-1992, First Diﬀerences Regression Results
Union AvgSal Educ Seas Hhind Firm Wage Obs.
Size Share (R2)
All Purchased .0025 .0021 .054 34.1∗∗∗ -.00016 -.00014 2.87∗∗∗ 336
Services (.0055) (.012) (.078) (11.98) (.00016) (.0005) (.587) (.349)
Buildings .006 -.0026 .265∗∗∗ 18.55∗ .00016 -.00017 3.86∗∗∗ 330
Repair (.013) (.020) (.105) (10.95) (.00013) (.0006) (.958) (.289)
Machine -.013∗∗ -.005 .147∗ 28.8∗∗ -.00001 .00065∗ 2.34∗∗∗ 329
Repair (.006) (.013) (.083) (14.7) (.0001) (.00037) (.499) (.337)
Commun. .0043 -.0064 -.041 17.4 -.00004 .0002 2.59∗∗∗ 326
(.006) (.013) (.103) (22.1) (.0001) (.0006) (1.03) (.276)
Legal .0012 -.0046 -.145 39.6∗∗ -.00016∗ .0009 2.84∗∗∗ 328
Services (.008) (.016) (.130) (18.8) (.00009) (.00068) (.819) (.173)
Accounting & -.004 .006 -.110 49.55 .00005 -.00014 1.42 324
Bookkeeping (.009) (.025) (.196) (35.97) (.0001) (.0005) (.956) (.076)
Advertising .003 .010 -.012 58.8∗∗ -.0003 .001 1.44 324
(.007) (.031) (.23) (27.5) (.00026) (.001) (1.05) (.158)
Software -.009 .008 -.436∗∗ 30.7 -.0000 -.001 4.78∗∗∗ 322
Services (.010) (.031) (.209) (30.4) (.0001) (.0008) (.719) (.248)
Refuse -.002 -.015 -.001 44.97∗∗ -.0002 .00023 2.70∗∗∗ 328
Services (.011) (.018) (.217) (20.25) (.00015) (.0008) (.547) (.230)
Standard errors clustered at the 2-digit SIC level in parenthesis.
∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level.
Not reported are the coeﬃcients of IT intensity, value added, and the constant term
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